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Abstract
ABSTRACT: Economic theory in the context of ﬂoating exchange rates
has focussed on underlying medium and long term direction of exchange
rate movements. Daily volatility is less well understood. One theory that
oﬀers an explanation for short term exchange rate movements is that of
the eﬃcient market hypothesis or EMH. Its application to the forex mar-
ket allows exchange rate movements to be understood as the reaction of
traders to relevant news. In an eﬃcient market traders react to news and
speciﬁcally to surprise news events which necessitate a re-evaluation of the
currency value. We test for the validity of this hypothesis in the context
of the daily rand/dollar forex market over a three year period, adding an
emerging market case to the literature. We test the signiﬁcance of macro-
economic news surprises -measured by the diﬀerence between actual and
forecast data - in driving daily exchange rates. We ﬁnd that surprises in
both real and nominal variables cause a statistically signiﬁcant reaction in
the exchange rate. The results support an asymmetry between news of
diﬀerent origin as only surprises that originate in the U.S. prove signiﬁ-
cant. Good news also seems to receive greater attention from traders than
bad news in our sample. Finally, we ﬁnd that the statistical signiﬁcance of
variables is time-varying.
KEYWORDS: Daily exchange rate, Macroeconomic news surprises and
eﬃcient market hypothesis.
1. Introduction
The economic theory of exchange rates focuses on the long run.
Standard explanations of the determination of the exchange rate rest
on the law of one price driving trade ﬂows, as evidenced by absolute or
relative purchasing power parity (PPP), determinants of capital ﬂows
in the theory of uncovered interest parity (UIP), and a more general
macroeconomic equilibrium approach in fundamental equilibrium ex-
change rate theory (FEER). All these approaches have in common
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that the exchange rate is viewed as the outcome of equilibrium rela-
tionships that hold in the long run. Empirical evidence is available to
suggest that these theories, or some combination of them, does indeed
hold, provided only that the relationships are sought in the under-
lying long run structure of the data rather than short run dynamic
movements.1
This leaves unresolved our understanding of the short run. Yet in
the context of trading on foreign exchange markets, particularly in the
relatively volatile emerging market currencies, the long run structure
underlying exchange rate determination is of little succour, especially
given the length of time that is often required for PPP, UIP or FEER
to manifest itself.
We are then left with the question of whether it is possible to
develop a systematic account of short run movements in exchange
rates? One suggestion has come from a variant of the eﬃcient markets
hypothesis (EMH). Both Engel and Frankel (1985) and Ito and Roley
(1986) noted in an examination of the US dollar that surprise events
in a number of speciﬁc economic variables, deviations between prior
market expectations and the actual event observed, were able to aﬀect
a change in US exchange rates. The underlying presumption is that all
available information had already been factored into the price of the
US currency by prior trades, such that movement in the price would
purely be the result of new information entering the market - hence
t h ei m p a c to fs u r p r i s ee v e n t s . 2
A sequence of subsequent studies, investigating a number of dif-
ferent exchange rates, has provided support for the hypothesis that
s u r p r i s ee v e n t sa r ea b l et om o v ee x c h a n g er a t e s . 3 Signiﬁcant exten-
1Famously, Johansen and Juselius (1992) demonstrated the operationalization
of the VECM estimation strategy which distinguishes clearly between long run
equilibrium relationships and short run dynamics on the estimation of a model
that combined PPP and UIP theory for the UK.
2The link to Fama (1970, 1991) eﬃcient markets is immediate.
3See Almeida et al (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Edison (1996), Faust
et al (2003), Galati and Ho (2003), Harris and Zabka (1995), Pearce and Solakoglu
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sions have been ﬁndings suggesting that the impact of surprises may
be time-varying in the sense that surprise events in speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
may be important in some time periods but not others,4 that there
may be asymmetries between good and bad news events,5 between US
and other country news events,6 between economic and political news
events,7 between real and nominal variables,8 and that speciﬁcv a r i -
ables may carry more weight than others.9 An important estimation
issue relates to the frequency of observations employed, with results
proving stronger the higher the frequency of the data employed.10
To date an examination of the impact of news events to emerging
market economies has been restricted.11 In this paper we examine
the extent to which news events can explain movements in currency
of one of the more important emerging markets - South Africa. The
application is particularly apposite, since the South African currency
has been particularly volatile over the course of the 1990’s, to an
extent that precludes reliance on PPP, UIP or FEER in explaining
the strength of the movement observed. The past decade has seen the
rand weaken 15.6% to the dollar in 1996, recover, collapse once more
in 1998, plunge to a record low of 13.85 to the dollar in 2001(ABSA,
2001) and now rise back to its current strength of around 6 to the
dollar in 2004.12 The Bank for International Settlements found that
4See Almeida et al (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Edison (1996),
Galati and Ho (2001), and Ito and Roley (1996).
5See Galati and Ho (2001).
6See Almeida et al (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Faust et al (2003),
Galati and Ho (2001).
7See Prast and de Vor (2001), Galati and Ho (2001).
8See Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Edison (1996), Engel and Frankel (1985).
9For instance Harris and Zabka (1985) point to the importance of US employ-
ment data, and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) to the importance of real variables
in the US, and nominal variables in Germany.
10See Almeida et al (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Pearce and So-
lakoglu (2003).
11We have not been able to locate a study which does so.
12Part of the reason for the volatility was contagion from the Asian crises of the
late 1990’s. See the discussion in Fedderke (2004). But this is only part of theMacroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 4
turnover in the rand currency market greatly exceeded that in other
emerging markets similar to South Africa highlighting its volatility
(Garrow, 2004). Developing an understanding of the volatility of the
rand remains a pressing task, extending to a government inquiry (The
Myburgh Commission).
The question in this paper is whether macroeconomic news ‘sur-
prises’ account for some of the rand/dollar volatility - particularly
since Aron and Ayogou (1997) ﬁnd ineﬃciencies in the South African
exchange rate market. The exchange rate under consideration in this
paper is the daily rand/dollar rate from June 2001 to June 2004 over
which time the rand has strengthened, not without ﬂuctuations, from
8.021 in June 2001 to 6.16 of June 2004 as seen in Figure 1.
Section 2 gives a brief description of the data used. In section 3
we present our results, and section 4 concludes.
2. Data
The data used in this investigation includes a number of economic
variables over a time period of 37 months. The dependent variable
used is the log change in the daily rand/dollar exchange rate where
the daily exchange rate is given by the rate at noon in New York.
This measure is used to allow all information or data releases to have
their impact from traders in both South Africa and the U.S. The ex-
planatory variables represent a number of diﬀerent economic indicators
suggested by the literature, subject to availability.
Variables cover events both for the USA and for South Africa, and
for both real and nominal variables. Macroeconomic data announce-
ments in South Africa were represented by the CPIX which is the
South African Reserve Banks (SARB’s) indicator of domestic inﬂa-
tion on a monthly basis; the Producer Price Index (PPI) which gives
am e a s u r eo fm o n t h l yi n ﬂation growth in goods used for production;
the Repo rate which is a proxy for interest rates and is adjusted at
story, and much remains to be done in trying to understand short term movement
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non-standardized intervals by the Monetary Policy Committee; GDP
which gives an indication of the economy’s growth on a quarterly basis,
the money supply (M3) calculated by Stats SA on a monthly basis and
the trade deﬁcit/surplus each month. The data releases originating in
the U.S. were represented by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) which is
am e a s u r eo fm o n t h l yi n ﬂation; monthly PPI; the Federal Funds rate
which serves a purpose similar to the South African Repo; non-farm
payrolls which indicates the creation of jobs each month; industrial
production which gives a measure of monthly economic activity and
the trade deﬁcit/surplus.
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables included.
Although not strictly comparable, the variables control for simi-
lar economic fundamentals covering both real and nominal variables
between South Africa and the USA. CPIX and CPI measure con-
sumer inﬂation in the two countries; the two PPI measures are di-
rectly comparable; the Federal Funds rate and the Repo both represent
central bank interest rate decisions; industrial production, non farm
payrolls and GDP measured economic activity/growth; the trade sur-
plus/deﬁcit gives a measure of trade activity for both countries; and
M3 was included to give an indication of money supply growth in
South Africa.
For all of these explanatory variables the size of a news ‘surprise’
is measured as the diﬀerence between the markets forecast and the
actual data announced. Forecast values were taken from the Reuters
consensus forecast for each event and from the Dow Jones-CNBC poll
when a Reuter’s forecast was not available. These forecasts were used
as a proxy for the markets’ forecast as a whole.13
Dummy variables identiﬁed “good” and “bad” news events. While
for most variables a positive surprise meant good news whereas a neg-
ative surprise meant bad news, in the case of inﬂa t i o nm e a s u r e db y
13The authors are grateful to Donovan Byrne and Factiva.com for access to
historic Reuters and Dow Jones articles as well as exchange rate data free of
charge. Actual data announcements were taken from the same sources via the
website of Factiva.com.Macroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 6
CPI, CPIX, PPI and M3 a positive surprise is classiﬁed as good/bad
depending on whether a country faces inﬂation or disinﬂation.14 On
certain inﬂation and interest rate events, classiﬁcation as good or bad
required reference to ﬁnancial press discussions surrounding the news
release. All other variables were good news if they were greater than
expected and bad news if less than expected. This gave a total of 24
dummies - a good and a bad for each variable employed. Object of the
construct is to test for asymmetries between the exchange rate impact
on good and bad news events.
Dummy variables were also constructed for country speciﬁcg o o d
or bad news events, regardless of which variable was the source of the
news. Object of the construct is to test for asymmetries between the
country source of good and bad news events.
All the data employed in the study is stationary. Table 2 reports
the relevant Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics. The dependent vari-
able is stationary since it is the log change in the daily exchange rate.
The macroeconomic ‘surprise’ variables are stationary by construction,
s i n c et h e ya r et h ed i ﬀerence between forecast and actual values.
3. Results
Given the stationarity of our data, we estimate by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS). Object of the investigation is to establish whether
macroeconomic news ‘surprises’ are signiﬁcant as a determinant of
daily rand/dollar exchange rate changes.
We begin by considering the impact of the various macroeconomic
‘surprise’ variables - the diﬀerence between actual and forecast data
for each variable at that point in time - on the daily log change in the
rand/dollar exchange rate. Speciﬁcally:




βi [Xi,t − Et(Xi,t)] + ut (1)
14Given the weak empirical link between M3 and inﬂation, in this case the
interpretation of the surprise event requires corresponding modulation.Macroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 7
where δt denotes the rand - dollar exchange rate at time t,t h eXi
represent the twelve sources of macroeconomic news surprises detailed
in the data section above, and Et denotes the expectations operator
at time t.
Results are reported in column 1 of Table 3.
The results indicate that relevant news events for the rand/dollar
exchange rate are US-based only, given the absence of statistical sig-
niﬁcance on all South African news events. Both real (industrial pro-
duction) and nominal (consumer and producer price inﬂation) news
events prove to impact the exchange rate. Thus we ﬁnd evidence of
the country news asymmetry that has been reported for developed
countries to transfer to the emerging market case, though the asym-
metry does not extend to the distinction between real and nominal
variables. News ‘surprises’ in countries such as Japan (see Pearson
and Solokoglu, 2003), Germany (see Almeida et al (1998), Andersen
and Bollerslev (1998), Pearson and Solokoglu, (2003)) and the Euro
area (see Prast and De Vor, (2001), Gelati and Ho (2001)) have been
insigniﬁcant in explaining daily exchange rate movements for much of
the time, while US news events have had a stronger impact. Given
the considerably smaller size of the South African economy relative
to any of these comparators, our ﬁnding of a similar asymmetry with
respect to the USA is not surprising.
Given the relatively poor goodness of ﬁt statistics, the results do
not suggest that news events captured for this study do not provide
a comprehensive depiction of short run dynamics of the rand - dollar
exchange rate.
The positive coeﬃcient on U.S. CPI implies that if consumer in-
ﬂation rises, the dollar appreciates relative to the rand. The standard
prior is to judge higher inﬂation as bad news. One possible explana-
tion of the counterintuitive ﬁnding may be expectations of interest rate
hikes on announcements of higher than expected inﬂationary pressure.
This interpretation is supported by the Engel and Frankel (1985) and
Ito and Roley (1986) ﬁndings that greater than expected money sup-
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explanation would be that in the recent U.S. recession, which falls
substantially within sample for our study, inﬂation may have been
interpreted as a sign of expanding economic activity, and thus inter-
preted as favourable rather than negative.
The more pressing question in the face of these results is whether
there exists a systematic account for the relatively small number of
variables in which news events prove statistically signiﬁcant to move-
ment in the rand/dollar exchange rate. We examine a number of
possible reasons.
First, over much of the sample period used there has been a steady
rand appreciation - which can be seen in Figure 1.15 Hence on any
given day there would have been a tendency for the exchange rate
to decrease, no matter what ‘surprises’ occurred - in eﬀect the de-
pendent variable is biased toward negative values, since it is the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of the exchange rate. Currently none of the explanatory
variables capture this eﬀect. In order to control for this possibility,
columns (2a) through (2c) of Table 3 control for the break in the series
at 20/12/2001, at which the sharp depreciation of the rand reversed,
by means of a dummy,16 by a trend variable, and both dummy and
trend. While there is some improvement in the goodness of ﬁtm e a -
sures, and certainly support for the presence of a break in the series at
20/12/2001, the central conclusion we drew from the results of column
(1) of Table 3 stand. The same three nominal and real US variables
remain signiﬁcant (though their standard errors decline), thus con-
ﬁrming the country asymmetry of news surprises for the rand/dollar
rate, without altering the size of the economic impact of the news
events.
Second, we test for the possibility that exchange rate movements
may be non-linear in surprises - speciﬁcally that large surprises may
have a more substantial impact than small - potentially even ignoring
news that is only marginally diﬀerent from that expected. In order to
15Possibly due to the high interest rate diﬀerentials with the U.S. and resultant
capital inﬂows into South Africa.
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test for this possibility each ‘surprise’ was squared while maintaining
its original positive or negative sign, and included in the regression.
Results, with squared variables and a combination of squared and lin-
ear variables, are reported in Column 1 of Table 4. While goodness
of ﬁt again increases marginally, the results lend little support to the
hypothesis that markets react disproportionately to large surprises.
Once again PPIUS and IND are the only variables signiﬁcant at the
5% level whilst CPIUS has become insigniﬁcant even at the 10% level.
The results are again consistent with the initial ﬁndings of country
asymmetry (reaction to US, not SA news events), though no asymme-
try between real and nominal news emerges.
As a third possibility we consider the suggestion of market ineﬃ-
ciency in rand forex trading, contained in Aron and Ayogou (1997).
We test for this through the introduction of lags into the estimation.
Where markets are eﬃcient, reaction to news surprises should be im-
mediate, not delayed. Under market eﬃciency lags of explanatory
variables should therefore be strictly insigniﬁcant statistically. In Ta-
b l e4 ,C o l u u m s( 2 a )a n d( 2 b )w ei n t r o d u c es i n g l ea n dt h r e ep e r i o d
lags of each explanatory variable into the speciﬁcation.17 Results in-
dicate that CPIUS impacts on the exchange rate three days after the
‘surprise’ at the 5% level and two days after the ‘surprise’ at the 10%
level of signiﬁcance while the contemporaneous eﬀect is now insignif-
icant. PPIUS remains signiﬁcant two days after the ‘surprise’ with
the economically correct sign and TRADESA was signiﬁcant with the
theoretically correct sign on its coeﬃcient two days after the data ‘sur-
prise’. All other variables and their lags, other than contemporaneous
PPIUS and IND, were insigniﬁcant. The signiﬁc a n c eo fl a g so fu pt o
72 hours after news events are consistent with the Aron and Ayogou
(1997) ﬁnding of market ineﬃciency. Certainly the ﬁnding is at odds
with strong EMH expectations.
As a fourth consideration we examine whether the international
17Recall that data is daily. We tested for numerous alternative lag structures,
without obtaining substantively diﬀerent results. Full results are available from
the authors on request.Macroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 10
ﬁnding of time-varying impact of news events is corroborated on the
rand - dollar rate. To do so, we estimated equation (1) over shorter
time periods of approximately 12 months, to test whether traders re-
act to diﬀerent variables over time. Results conﬁrm the international
ﬁndings. Consider the evidence of Table 5.In Columns (1a) through
(1c) we report results for the 1/6/2001-1/11/2002, 1/6/2002-1/6/2003
and 1/6/2003-30/6/2004 time periods respectively. IND is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level in only the ﬁrst and second time periods whilst being
insigniﬁcant in the last even at the 10% level. Similarly for U.S. PPI,
which is only signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the second time period.
The second period also shows U.S. CPI and TRADEUS as signif-
icant. In the ﬁnal time period no variable is signiﬁcant, suggesting
a total insigniﬁcance of economic data ‘surprises’ in driving daily ex-
change rates.
A ﬁnal possibility we considered by way of explanation of the rel-
ative insigniﬁcance of news events in explaining changes in the rand -
dollar rate, was that the frequency of our data may simply not be high
enough. A number of international studies have been conducted on
data at minute frequency, rather than daily data, and noted improved
results under the higher frequency.18 Unfortunately, the present study
was unable to source data of a signiﬁcantly higher frequency. While
we did examine results that introduced US opening, US noon, and
US closing rand/dollar rates, results did not change signiﬁcantly from
those reported above.19 Testing the hypothesis on higher frequency
data thus remains a task for future research.
Thus far our results have pointed to two asymmetries in the impact
of news events. First, US news appears to impact the rand/dollar
rate, while SA news does not, and second the impact of news events
may be time-varying. By contrast, we have not found evidence of an
asymmetry between nominal and real variables.
As a ﬁnal analytical step we address the question of whether there
18See Almeida et al (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Pearce and So-
lakoglu (2003).
19Full results are available from the authors on request.Macroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 11
exists an asymmetry between good and bad news events for the rand -
dollar rate. Estimation was under the inclusion of a good and bad news
dummy for each variable over the entire 37-month period. Results are
reported in column 3 of Table 4. Only good news about U.S. industrial
production was signiﬁcant in explaining exchange rate ﬂuctuations at
the 5% level. Good news about the SA Repo was signiﬁcant at the
10% level, with better than expected interest rate decisions leading
to rand appreciation.20 The evidence thus does suggest an additional
a s y m m e t r yt on e w se v e n t sa ﬀecting the rand/dollar rate. Good news
appears to impact the rate more dramatically than does bad news -
at least over the sample period under consideration.
As a further extension we also considered country-speciﬁcg o o da n d
bad news events, with dummies for good and bad news events that
emerge for either the US or SA, regardless of the variable that was the
source of the news. Results are reported in Column (2a) of Table 5.
Only US good news on macroeconomic variables possibly inﬂuences
the daily rand/dollar exchange rate at the 10% level over the 37-month
period. The coeﬃcient is theoretically consistent, suggesting that US
good news leads to dollar appreciation. None of the other country
speciﬁcn e w st y p e sa r es i g n i ﬁcant.
In estimation, we further estimated the speciﬁcation over succes-
sive six-month periods.21 Results, in columns (2b) to (2g) of Table 5,
indicate that the impact of news events may well be time-varying. In
the ﬁrst, second, third, ﬁfth and sixth periods none of the dummies
were statistically signiﬁcant. In the fourth time period U.S. good news
20Recall that the deﬁnition of “good” and “bad” here was event-speciﬁc, and
relied on a careful consideration of prevailing market perceptions at the time of the
event. Running the good/bad news regression over the shorter frequency exchange
rate data we constructed, did add good news about the SA money supply and good
news about non-farm payrolls to the list of signiﬁcant variables though it renders
good news about U.S. industrial production insigniﬁcant. This was one instance
where results were marginally aﬀected by the use of slightly higher frequency data.
21These thus cover the 1/6/2001-30/12/2001, 1/1/2002-30/6/2002, 1/7/2002-
30/12/2002, 1/1/2003-30/6/2003, 1/7/2003-30/12/2003, 1/1/2004-30/6/2004
time periods.Macroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 12
was signiﬁcant at the 1% level with the intuitively plausible implica-
tion of rand depreciation. In the same period South African good news
was associated with rand appreciation, signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
4. Conclusion and Evaluation
This study considers the impact of macroeconomic news events on
daily changes in the rand/dollar exchange rate.
We ﬁnd that news events do impact on the exchange rate.
Asymmetries in the relationship between news and exchange rate
movements are prevalent however. First, US news events impact the
rate in more variables, in more time periods, and with greater strength
than do South African news events. In fact, we ﬁnd very little evidence
of South African news having any signiﬁcance on the daily rand/dollar
rate whatsoever. Second, good news appears to impact the exchange
rate statistically more strongly than bad news - though again this has
a preponderance of US rather than SA news events. Third, the impact
of news events is time-varying. The news events that impact on the
markets change over time - suggesting that traders at any given time
pay closer attention to some speciﬁc variables (which vary over time),
rather than all potentially relevant news. The one dimension in which
we do not ﬁnd an asymmetry, is between real and nominal variables.
We ﬁnd that both real (industrial production) and nominal (inﬂation
rate) variables impact on the rand/dollar rate, bearing in mind that
these are US, not SA news events.
The ineﬃciency implied by the time varying impact of news events,
ﬁnds further corroboration. Introduction of lagged news events into
estimation suggested that the exchange rate may react to news events
up to 72 hours after their occurrence. The implication is that the
extent of market eﬃciency in the rand/dollar forex trade is perhaps
somewhat less than that required for a straightforward conﬁrmation
of the EMH.
The impact of news events on the South African exchange rate
thus comes with qualiﬁcation. Certainly news events, while signiﬁ-Macroeconomic News ‘Surprises’ 13
cant in some dimensions, are not the only determinants of changes
in the rand/dollar rate - goodness of ﬁt remained low throughout the
estimations reported for this study - and the evidence supporting the
presence of market ineﬃciency suggests that structural impediments
to eﬃc i e n ta d j u s t m e n to ft h ee x c h a n g er a t em a ye x i s ti nS o u t hA f r i c a n
forex markets.
Equally, however, work on higher frequency data than that which
was available for this study, remains as a topic for future research to
shed additional light on the extent of market eﬃciency in the South
African foreign exchange markets.
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 Table 1: Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Country Variable  Description  ‘Surprises’ Mean  Standard Dev.  Announcement time  Unit of Measurement 
n/a DLNER  Change: 
Rand/Dollar 
Exchange Rate 
n/a -.3173E-3  .012860  Daily: NY Noon  Log Difference 
SA CPIX Consumer 
Inflation 
32  0.000995  0.087  Middle/End of month  % growth year on year 
USA CPIUS Consumer 
Inflation 
28 -0.000995 0.027769  Middle/End  of  month  % growth year on year 
SA PPISA  Producer  Price 
Inflation 
33  0.000498  0.150217  Middle/End of month  % growth year on year 
USA PPIUS  Producer  Price 
Inflation 
35 -0.001119 0.109618  Middle/End  of  month  before CPI % growth year on year 
SA  REPO  Interest Rate  6  -0.001866 0.052901  Ad Hoc  % 
USA  FED  Interest Rate  2  0  0.012477  Ad Hoc  % 
USA NFP  Employment  37  -1517.413 20090.91  Beginning  of month  Change in actual jobs 
USA IND    Output  30  -0.001741 0.060689  Middle of month  Monthly % change 
SA GDP  Output  11  -0.002736 0.060857 End  of  month-Quarterly  Quarterly % growth 
SA  TRADESA  Trade Balance  34  11.35044  528.14  End of month  Million rands 
USA TRADEUS  Trade  Balance  36  -9.44029  526.663  Middle/End of month  Million dollars 













Variable   ADF Test Statistic  Critical Value (5%) 
DLNER -21.1494*  -2.8656 
CPIXSA -28.1995*  -2.8655 
CPIUS -28.2323*  -2.8655 
PPISA -28.1961*  -2.8655 
PPIUS -28.1987*  -2.8655 
REPO -28.2312*  -2.8655 
FED -28.1957*  -2.8655 
NFP -28.3581*  -2.8655 
IND -28.2192*  -2.8655 
GDP -28.2534*  -2.8655 
TRADESA -28.1216*  -2.8655 
TRADEUS -28.2049*  -2.8655 
M3 -28.1115* -2.8655 
 
 
* denotes rejection of the null of non-stationarity at the 5% level of significance Table 3: Effects of all ‘surprises’ on daily rand/dollar exchange rate 
 
 (1)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c) 


















































































































2 0.004734 0.024724 0.007517  0.025438 


























Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors: figures in square parentheses denote 
probability levels; * denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and *** at the 10% level of 
significance 
 
 Table 4: Nonlinear variables, lags and variable specific dummies 
 
 (1a)  (1b)    (2a)  (2b)    (3) 































   -0.0035112 
(0.011111) 







0.0057381     
(0.0076385) 
























    -0.0014575    
(0.0062470) 







0.6814E-3     
(0.0032923) 
























    0.6781E-6       
(0.2198E-5) 







-0.1169E-9      
(0.5207E-9) 





















IND    0.0077753     
(0.029274) 







0.025660      
(0.071138) 























M3    0.0019206     
(0.0044855) 







0.1390E-3     
(0.0019576) 





















REPO    0.3405E-3       
(0.014410) 







-0.0042881      
(0.018896) 














     GDP(-2)    -0.00572 
(0.00801) 
  
     GDP(-3)    0.001389 
(0.008285) 
  










     M3(-2)    -0.0002 
(0.001614) 
  
     M3(-3)    -0.00085 
(0.00161) 
  









       TRADEUS(-2)    9.48E-07 
(8.81E-07) 
  
     TRADEUS(-3)    7.44E-07 
(8.84E-07) 
  










     TRADESA(-2)    -2.00E-06** 
(8.68E-07) 
  
     TRADESA(-3)    -4.86E-07 
(8.67E-07) 
  










     FED(-2)    -0.03227 
(0.037642) 
  
     FED(-3)    -0.00368 
(0.037707) 
  










     REPO(-2)    0.002779 
(0.008747) 
  




2 0.010557 0.015514    -0.002372  0.000972    -0.00208 
PROB (F-
STATISTIC) 

































Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors: figures in square parentheses denote probability 
levels: * denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% and *** at the 10% level of significance Table 5: Time Varying Effects 
  (1a) (1b) (1c)    (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)  2(g) 















































































































































          






          






          
ADJ R
2 0.005941 0.062900 -0.022433    0.005265  0.011331 0.017276 -0.027956 0.057222 -0.004105  -0.014855 
PROB (F-
STATISTIC) 
0.286852 0.003043 0.924177    0.084636 0.227984 0.188466 0.971320 0.023065 0.485144  0.715387 
Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors; figures in square parentheses denote probability levels; * denotes significance at the 1%, ** at the 5% 
and *** at the 10% level of significance 